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1 0  Introductipn 
0.1  Origin  of  this project 
On  27  September  1977  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities  decided  (decision 
number  77/616/EEC)  to  initiate three  joint studies  in 
informatics.  The  first of  these,  on  data  security.and 
confidentiality,  was  described  as  follows: 
The  main  object  of  this  study  is  to  examine,  in 
conjunction with  the  Committee  of  National  Experts 
convened  by  the  Commission,  the  chief problems  relating 
to  the  harmonization  of  Community  legislation covering 
the protection of private life and  the  development  of 
codes  of  application  and·  corresponding  standards. 
The  work  will  include  analysis  and  classification of 
the  problems  and,  in particular: 
- estimates  of  the  quantitative  and  qualitative  aspects 
of  the  movement  of  data  across  frontiers  inside  and 
outside  the  Community, 
possible  role  of  Community  standards  with  a  view  to 
easier  control  of  such  movement,  reduction  of  costs 
and  opening  of  markets  as  a  complement  to  effects of 
legislation - identification of priorities for  the 
adoption  of  Community  standards, 
3 - preparatory  studies  with  regard  to  cost estimates. 
Costs  and  possible distortion of  competition  which 
could  ensue  from  different  national  legislations; 
costs  resulting  from  Community  harmonization;  impact 
of  costs  borne  by  the  public  and  private sectors  and 
by  individuals, 
- identification of  appropriate  measures  offering 
equivalent  security at  Community  level, 
- analysis  of  studies  undertaken  at  national  level  in 
the  Member  States  and  other  countries  such  as  Sweden 
and  the  United  States, 
- analysis  of  problems  relating  to  data  security which 
could  have  an  effect  on  confidentiality,  legislation 
and  standards,  and  a  definition  of  the  studies  which 
should  be  carried  out. 
The  continuation  of  work  resulting  from  this  analysis 
will  be  decided  upon  in  the  context  of  the  multiannual 
programme. 
Following  this decision,  three  objectives  were  identified: 
1.  examining  the  need  for  harmonization  of  legislation, 
recommendations  and  standards  on  privacy; 
2.  improved  control  of  computer  data  security  including 
its technical  feasibility  and  financial  implications; 
4 3.  improved  insight  into  the  impact  of  privacy  and 
security measures. 
In  view  of  these,  six  items  were  selected  by  the Steering 
Committee  consisting of  delegates  from  the  three 
institutes  (GMD,  !RIA,  NCC),  in  close  consultation with 
the  Committee  of  National  Experts: 
1.  Quality  and  quantity  of  transborder  data  flow. 
2.  The  character  of  the  organization  and  the  technical 
practice  of  Data  Inspection  Boards. 
3.  The  natural  person/other  legal  entity problem. 
4.  International  economic  aspects  of  data privacy 
regulation. 
5.  Technical  aspects  of  the  right  of  access. 
6.  Control,  audit  and  enforcement  of  privacy  requirements 
and  their  impact  on  security. 
These  items  did  not  cover  the  whole  area  of  the  subject, 
but  were  considered  to  have  priority because  of  their 
urgency,  importance  and  general  interest;  the  Council  had 
foreseen  that  further  work  would  be  needed  in  the 
multiannual  programme. 
5 0.2  Motivation  for  the  items  in  the  study 
The  first  item,  on  transborder  data  flows,  is explicitly 
mentioned  in  the Council's decision.  The  possibility of 
frustration  of  data protection  by  processing  personal 
data outside  controlled areas,  the distortion  of 
competition  which  could  result  from  this,  and  unease 
which  had  already  been  publicly expressed  reinforce  its 
topicality. 
The  second  item,  on  data  inspection  boards,  seeks  to  shed 
light  on  one  aspect  of  data protection legislation which 
has  been  treated differently  in different countries.  Any 
attempt  at harmonization  of  legislation will  need  to  take 
into account  not  only  the  rules  defining  the  powers  and 
duties  of  such  boards,  but  also  their  administrative 
practices. 
The  third  item,  on  the  natural/legal  person  question, 
relates  to  a  topic  which  has  been  treated differently  in 
the  laws  of  different countries,  and  which  has  been  the 
subject  of  international  controversy. 
The  fourth  item,  on  the  cost  aspect,  is  seen  as  an 
important practical  matter  about  which  further 
information  is  needed.  In  particular,  the  cost  of 
complying  with  different,  and  possibly conflicting, 
national  laws,  and  fears  that  international  trade  both 
inside  and  outside  the  EEC  will  be  distorted  by  such 
differences,  motivated  the  inclusion  of  this  item. 
6 The  fifth  item,  on  the  right of  access,  relates to  one  of 
the  central  requirements  of  any  data protection  law.  The 
possibility of  efficient  and  economical  satisfaction of 
this obligation,  without  prejudice  to  security  and  other 
aspects  of  data protection,  and  without  undue 
interference  in  the  legitimate  work  of  the  data  user,  is 
of  interest  to all  involved  in  the  subject. 
The  sixth  item,  on  data protection inspection,  is 
concerned  with  the  problem of  ensuring  that data 
protection  laws  are  observed;  some  measures  in  this area 
are  considered  necessary,  and  it is  hoped  that procedures 
can  be  defined  which  are  useful  in different  countries 
and  which  will  give  confidence  to  the  public  that  their 
interests are  indeed  safeguarded. 
Although  all three  institutes bear  responsibility  for  all 
six  items,  prime  responsibility  for  each  item  was 
assigned  to  one  institute as  below,  with  the  stated 
approximate  manpower: 
item  1  !RIA  3  manmonths 
item  2  GMD  3  manmonths 
item  3  !RIA  4  manmonths 
item  4  GMD  6  manmonths 
item  5  !RIA  4  manmonths 
item  6  NCC  10  manmonths 
7 The  following  are  those  who  did  most  of the  work  in  this 
study: 
for  GMD:  H  Burkert,  E  F  M Hogrebe 
for  IRIA:  F  aancilhon,  J-P  Chamoux,  A  Grissonnanche 
for  NCC:  H  H  W Pitcher 
The  project leader  for  the  Commission  was  Emile  Peeters. 
This  English version of the  final  report  was  produced  at 
NCC. 
0.3  Structure of the  summary  report 
After this  introduction,  each  item is treated separately 
in the  corresponding  sections  numbered  1  to 6:  the  final 
section  7  describes  the main  features  of the 
collaboration of the  institutes in  this work,  and  gives 
suggestions of topics deserving  further  study. 
8 1  Quality  and  quantity of  transborder  data  flows 
This  study  has  assembled  information  on  the  current state 
of  transborder  data  flow  (TBDF)  within  the  European 
Economic  Community  and  between  member  states  and  outside 
countries.  This  information  falls  under  three  headings: 
major  data  flows  at present 
classification of  these  flows 
quantification  of  these  flows. 
The  major  dataflows  at present  have  been  analysed 
following  a  survey  which  revealed  their  great diversity, 
as  much  with  respect  to  the  character  of  the  operators  of 
these  flows  as  to  the  nature  of  the  transmitted  data  and 
the  medium  used.  These  TBDFs  did  not  originate  with 
computing:  the  need  for  them,  and  their  existence,  result 
from  the  freeing  of  trade  and  from  its  new  world-wide 
scale,  which  require  businessmen  and  information  to 
travel  more  and  more  throughout  Europe  and  the  world. 
Nevertheless,  the  computerisation  of  companies,  now  just 
at  its beginning,  will  result  in  increasing quantities  of 
transmitted  information  and  higher  transmission  speeds. 
So  we  can  foresee  in  the  next  few  years  a  large  increase 
in  the  amount  of  TBDF  because  of  the  spreading  business 
use  of  computers. 
We  must  note  that  this  computerisation at present 
concerns  only  companies,  so  the  only  existing  flows  are 
9 professional  ones.  But  private  TBDF  will  appear  in  the 
next  few  years,  resulting  from  the  integration  of 
computers  in  everyday  life.  Electronic mail  is  an 
example  of  such  private  development  of  computers;  some  of 
our  air-mail letters will  become  electronic TBDF. 
Besides  these  traditional  flows,  computing  has  created 
specific  flows  of  a  new  kind:  exchanges  of  programs, 
transfers  of  raw  data  and  of  information  about  data 
processing,  computer  bureau  services,  etc.  But  the 
amount  of  this  new  part  of  TBDF  seems  to  be  very  small  at 
present,  representing  only  a  few  percent  of  the  total  as 
revealed  by  our  enquiry. 
The  classification of  TBDF  which  we  have  presented 
emphasises  the  basic  dichotomy  between: 
dataflows  using  a  material  medium:  magnetic  tapes, 
discs,  punched  cards,  etc. 
dataflows  using  telecommunications. 
This  distinction  seems  unquestionable.  Even  if  the 
actual  data carried  by  post  and  telecommunications  are  of 
the  same  nature,  the  flows  differ  in  their  status  as 
regards  customs,  postal,  telecommunications,  trade  and 
tax  regulations.  Further,  the  structure  of  costs  is 
different  in  each  case.  This  distinction,  though  it is 
necessary,  does  not  cover  all  the  needs  of  analysis,  and 
we  saw  that  other  criteria must  be  used  to  make  an 
orderly  census  of  TBDF: 
10 the  distinction  between  personal  data  and  non-personal 
data  and,  within  personal  data,  between  data  about  a 
physical  person  and  data  about  a  non-physical  person 
the distinction  between  commercial  flows  and  non-
commercial  flows 
the  operator's character 
the  direction  of  the  exchanges,  especially when 
countries  outside  the  European  Community  are  involved, 
and  in particular  USA. 
As  regards  the  quantification of  TBDF,  our  survey  pointed 
out  the  difficulty of  obtaining  useful  information  by 
direct enquiry.  Systematic  statistical data  on  this 
subject at a  national  level  seems  to  be  lacking.  On  the 
other  hand,  it turned  out  to  be  very difficult  to  get 
information  from  sources  such  as  companies.  The  large 
number  of  information  sources  would  require  the  setting 
up  of  a  very  powerful  means  of  enquiry,  out  ot  proportion 
to  this  initial study.  Further,  this  kind  of  data  is 
generally  considered  confidential  by  companies,  which 
would  obviously  hamper  its collection,  even  for  a 
statistical  survey. 
Lastly,  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  a  substantial 
effort  is still needed  to  define  more  precisely  a 
satisfactory method  of  evaluation  of  TBDFs.  The  ideas  on 
this  subject  presented  in  1.3.4 could  constitute  the 
starting-point of  more  extensive  research  in  the 
continuing  Community  programme. 
11 In  conclusion,  this  study  emphasizes  the  importance  of 
TBDF  for  European  countries.  This  has  three  aspects: 
a)  A commercial  stake:  we  have  pointed  out  how  much  TBDF 
is  bound  up  with  the  internationalisation of  the 
western  ecomony  and  with  its liberal character.  In 
some  sectors  of  the  economy  (banks,  financial 
institutions,  airlines,  and  all multinational 
companies)  the  maintenance  and  development  of  free 
exchanges  of  information,  and  the  possibility of 
using  for  them  the  most  suitable medium,  as  regards 
cost,  quantity  and  speed  of  communication,  remains 
fundamental.  Therefore  we  must  watch  over  the 
maintenance  and  development  of  such  exchanges  in 
Europe,  while  respecting  the  principles  of  individual 
freedom -and  free  competition  established  in  the 
European  Community's  treaties. 
b)  A cultural stake:  we  have  pointed  out  in  this  section 
how  great  is  the  risk  of  cultural alienation.  The 
risk  come-s  from  the  development  of  new  information 
media,  such  as  those  now  required  for  the  press.  The 
development  of  such  new  technologies  must  not  help 
the  creation  of  monopolies  benefiting  only  companies 
outside  the  European  Community.  Third-world 
countries  are  by  now  quite  conscious  of  the  problems 
of  an  American-dominated  press,  and  attach  great 
importance  to  achieving  a  better  balance  in  this 
field.  Among  developed  countries  also,  this  balance 
12 must  be  maintained.  Concerning  databanks,  the 
Euronet  network  is  an  important  factor,  which  should 
allow  Europe  to  take  up  a  challenge  posed  by  the 
American  databanks  and  information  retrieval  systems 
which  have  established  their  reputation. 
c)  An  industrial  stake:  the  connection  of  data 
processing  and  telecommunications  will  give  rise  to  a 
wide  range  of  new  products  and  services.  Many  have 
already  embarked  on  this  course  in  Europe.  The  entry 
of  IBM  in  such  a  project  as  SBS  clearly  shows  how 
attractive  the  future  seems  for  large  companies 
combining  data  processing  and  telecommunications. 
But  it also  clearly  shows  that it will  become  more 
and  more  difficult  to  sell data  processing  equipment 
without  integrating  it  in  large  networks. 
Information  competition will  demand,  in  this  field 
too,  that  European  companies  give  themselves  world-
wide  range  and  equal  opportunity  to  the  largest 
American  trusts. 
13 2  Organization  and  method  of  operation  of  the  data 
protection authorities 
2.0  Relevance  of  the  item  and  approach 
Any  discussion  of  a  possible  harmonisation  of  data 
protection  in  the  EEC  has  to  consider  the  legal  material 
already developed  in  that  area.  Even  more  important, 
however,  is  the  way  in  which  data  protection legislation 
is  or  is  intended  to  be  implemented.  Main  agencies  of 
this  implementation  are  the  data protection authorities. 
We  have  therefore  described  these  authorities  in  the  EEC 
area  and  we  have  also  included  Sweden  because  of  its 
outstanding  experience.  The  description  is mainly  based 
on  the  drafted  or  enacted  data protection  laws  (deadline 
1  September  1979),  but  also  includes  experiences  and 
methods  of  operation  (especially  licensing  procedures  and 
inspection  methods  - see  also  section  6  of  the  final 
report). 
On  the  basis  of  this material  we  have  come  to  some 
general  but  preliminary  conclusions  on  the  role  and 
significance  of  these  institutions.  From  these 
conclusions  we  have  then  derived  some  suggestions  with 
regard  to  the  future  importance  of  these  agencies, 
especially vis-A-vis  the  recent  recommendations  of  the 
European  Parliament. 
14 2.1  Data  protection agencies  in  the  context  of  national  data 
protection  laws  and  draft  laws  in  the  European  Economic 
Community  and  Sweden 
In  the  final  report  (section  2.1)  we  have  described  the 
data protection authorities  of  Denmark,  France  and 
Luxemburg  in  the  framework  of  the  existing  laws,  and  the 
envisaged  control  authorities  of  Belgium,  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  Netherlands  (on  the  basis  of  the  most 
frequently  discussed drafts  and  reports).  The  data 
protection  systems  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and 
Sweden  have  received  a  more  detailed description  (in 
section  2.2  of  the  final  report),  since  more  experience 
was  available  there  at  the  time  of  the  report.  In  detail 
(country:  main  legal  source  document/institution 
described): 
Belgium:  Draft:  Vanderpoorten  (1976)/Commission 
d'Inspection 
Denmark:  Private  Registers  etc.  Act  (1978),  Public 
Authorities Registers  Act  (1978)/Data  Surveillance 
Authority 
France:  Loi  no.  78-17  du  6  janvier 1978  relatif  ~ 
l'informatique,  aux  fichiers  et  aux  libert~s/Commission 
Nationale  de  l'Informatique et des  Libe~t~~ 
:., 
15 United Kingdom:  Lindop  Report  (1978)/Data Protection 
Authority 
Luxemburg:  Loi  du  31  mars  1979  reglementant !'utilisation 
des  donnees  nominatives  dans  les  traitement 
informatiques/Ministre  competent  and  Commission 
Consultative 
Netherlands:  Draft Bill on  Personal Data  Systems 
(1976)/Registration  Board 
Federal Republic of Germany: 
On  the  federal  level:  Gesetz  zum  Schutz  vor  Missbrauch 
personenbezogener Daten bei der  Datenverarbeitung 
(1978)/Federal  Commissioner  for  Data Protection  (public 
sector,  federal  level)  and  Supervisory Authorities 
(private  sector) 
On  the Land  level:  Hessisches  Datenschutzgesetz  (1978) 
(as  an  example  for  the  public  sector,  Land  level)/The 
Hesse  Data Protection Commissioner 
Sweden:  Data  Act  (including  the modifications  of 1  July 
1979)/Data Inspection Board 
For  each of these,  we  have  described,  as  of interest  to 
the  user,  the  conditions  under  which  data processing  is 
permitted  (with  emphasis  on  the private  sector) .  As  of 
interest to the  data  subjects,  we  have  outlined  the 
rights  they can  exercise  and  the  conditions  under  which 
16 they can  exercise  them.  Having  thus  characterised the 
field of operation of  the  data protection authorities,  we 
have  then  specified their structures,  tasks  and  method  of 
operation.  Special  emphasis  was  given  to the 
institutions of Germany  and  Sweden  since  they already had 
implementation  experience. 
We  think it worthwhile,  as  soon  as  more  experience  is 
available,  to make  also  secondary material  such  as 
application  forms,  regulations  and  directives  accessible 
on  an  EEC  level,  and  to  give  a  manual  (to be  updated 
regularly)  to users  and  other  interested parties who  wish 
to operate within the  EEC. 
We  have  refrained  from  classifying data protection 
authorities  to  avoid  any misleading  oversimplifications 
that tend  to arise with  such  summary  surveys.  It has 
been our  main  intention with  these descriptions  to  show 
that the  specific national  solutions of the  problems  of 
data protection are  closely connected  to  the political 
and  legal  tradition of each country. 
On  the  other hand,  we  have  realised  some  general  trends 
with  regard  to  these authorities,  which  arise  from  the 
fact  that the  problems  of data  protection present 
themselves  in  the  EEC  and  in  Sweden  in  a  very  similar 
way. 
17 2.2  Role  and  significance of the data protection authorities 
These  general  observations  have  been presented  in  section 
2.3  of the  final  report as  a  first attempt  to  judge  the 
role  and  significance of  these  authorities  both  on 
national  and  international  level. 
We  have  identified the data protection authorities  as 
unique  types  of administration  even  within  their  own 
national  environment.  As  the main  feature  of this  new 
type,  we  have  pointed  out  the dialogue-orientated  form  of 
operation which  leads  to  specific  demands  on  the  staff 
and  administrative structure. 
This  feature  results  from  the  specific  function  this  kind 
of organisation has  to  fulfil:  although  they act  as 
control  agencies,  they operate  in  a  preventive  rather 
than  in  a  repressive manner  and  put high  emphasis  on 
education,  at least at  the  present  stage.  They  thus  help 
to provide  general  acceptance  for  information 
technologies  in modern  societies. 
On  the  international  level,  they have  to  observe  the  area 
of  transborder data  flow  in order  to  counterbalance 
international  developments  that might  weaken  the  national 
acceptance  of data protection.  So  their main  criterion, 
when  they give opinions  or decisions  in  that area,  is 
whether  the  level of data protection  achieved  nationally 
is guaranteed  abroad.  At  the  same  time,  within their 
18 educative  functions,  they  have  to  give  assistance  to 
users  and  persons  concerned  in questions  of  transborder 
data  flow.  In  this  area  we  have  observed  already well 
operating  forms  of  international  co-operation,  a 
development  that dates  back  to  the  phase  of  "emerging 
data protection  in  Europe",  when  these  agencies  gave  each 
other  assistance  in  their  planning  stages. 
This picture,  however,  represents  only  an  impression  of 
the  situation at  the  time  when  this  report  was  drafted. 
With  the  recommendation  of  the  European  Parliament  and 
its accompanying  report,  new  demands  have  been  put 
forward  to  these  authorities,  to  national  legislators  in 
the  EEC  and  the  Commission. 
2.3  Future  demands  on  the  data protection  authorities within 
the  EEC 
These  demands  and  future  trends  in  the  development  of 
data protection authorities  have  been  analysed  in  section 
2.4  of  the  final  report. 
On  the  basis  of  this preliminary  study,  we  have  come  to 
the  following  conclusions  with  regard  to  the  recent 
recommendations  of  the  European  Parliament: 
19 Each of the  laws  and  drafts analysed  provides  for  some 
kind of data protection agency.  Though  their powers 
differ widely,  each organisation includes  a  publicly 
accessible  register,  which,  however,  also differs  in  its 
extent.  Nevertheless  these  organisations  already 
represent  the  nucleus  of  a  practicable  international  co-
operation that  can  take  care of the  specific  demands 
within the  EEC. 
Further  demands  on  these  authorities  (with  regard  to 
harmonising  their decision-making  and/or  licensing 
powers)  should,  at the  present  stage,  be  left for  the 
individual  nations  to develop,  since  some  of  these 
agencies  have  not  even  been  implemented,  while  others  are 
still in their consolidation phase.  Any  outside  attempt 
to  impose  new  structures or  jurisdictions - at least at 
the present  stage - might  endanger  their role of 
encouraging  national  acceptance of  information 
technologies  and  hinder  their effectiveness. 
With  regard  to transborder data  flow,  it is difficult to 
foresee  that countries  already having  a  high  national 
level  of data protection would  leave  that  in  favour  of  a 
lower but more  generally  accepted  level.  International 
agreements  or harmonisation procedures  that do  not  leave 
the option of restricting  transborder  data  flow  in 
specific cases  are  likely to fail. 
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and  functions  tend  to  lead  to  a  stronger political 
involvement of these authorities,  whether  intended  or 
not.  They  have  to  provide  acceptance  for  a  technology 
that has  become  enormously  important  to  the  national 
economy,  internal  and  external  security  and  national 
sovereignty.  At  the  same  time,  these  agencies  represent 
a  high concentration of  expertise  and  factual  knowledge 
in that field.  This  stronger political  involvement  can 
be  seen  in the  fact  that,  though  initially questions  of 
data protection were  more  or  less all-party issues,  the 
modification of  existing  laws  and  the  development  of 
sectoral data protection  (internal  security,  social 
security,  employer/employee  relationships)  have  become 
controversial  issues.  In  the  field of transborder data 
flow,  issues  of national  economy  and  sovereignty become 
increasingly intermingled with  the  original data 
protection issue. 
This  development  must  be  closely watched,  outside  the  EEC 
as  well,  and  any  artificial restriction to that  area  is 
likely to be  impractical. 
Instead,  it is  suggested that  in  the  field  of 
international data protection  law,  an  upward  approach 
should  be  attampted,  i.e.  national  legislation and  EEC 
activities  should  give whatever  assistance  they  can  to 
the practical  co-operation of  existing  and  upcoming  data 
protection authorities,  including  those  outside  the  EEC. 
21 Only  on  the  basis  of  day-to-day  co-operation,  as  already 
in practice  between  existing agencies,  can  long-range 
workable  solutions  be  developed  in  this  complex  area. 
2.4  Possible  keypoints  for  future  research 
Our  awareness  of  the  complexity  of  the  data protection 
issue,  seen  nationally  in  the  discussions  on  the 
modification of  existing  laws  and  the  implementation  of 
sectoral  data  protection,  and  internationally  in  the 
attempts  to draft  international  agreements,  leads  us  to 
stress  the  necessity  of  further  joint scientific 
observation  and  research  in  this  area  (see  section  2.5  of 
the  final  report}. 
Within  the  area  of  research  already  covered  by  this  study 
we  suggest: 
further  compilation  and  analysis  of  secondary  legal 
mat~rial,  i.e.  decisions  of  the  data protection 
authorities,  sectoral  regulations,  forms,  etc.,  issued 
by  the  relevant  authorities,  possibly  compiled  in  a 
periodically updated  user  handbook; 
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transborder data  flow,  with  special  consideration  of 
issues that are not  prima  facie  issues of data 
protection. 
Outside  the  area of the present research we  suggest: 
inclusion of the  third-world  countries  in  the  above-
mentioned  research,  with  special emphasis  on 
consequences  that affect the  EEC  as  such; 
analysis of the  role of  a  possible  future  EEC  Data 
Protection  Body,  taking  into account  the  suggested 
upward  approach; 
consequences  in the  area of sectoral data protection, 
especially the protection of research data  in  the  EEC; 
possible educative measures  in  the  area of data 
protection both  for  the  user  and  data  subject  in  the 
EEC. 
23 3  The  physical  person/non-physical  person  problem 
Due  to  the  superficial  reactions  of  the  general  public, 
which  were  gauged  during  the  recent  conference  in Paris 
on  'Data  Processing  and  Society',  it is  becoming  a 
generally accepted  social  objective  to  ensure  that  a 
European  citizen has  a  satisfactory awareness  of  the 
places  where  he  is  on  file,  and  the  information  contained 
in  these files.  By  a  strange  accident  of  history,  the 
idea  of  giving  non-physical  persons  protection  of  the 
same  type  as  that which  is offered  today  to  physical 
persons  has  asserted  itself more  and  more.  Having  been 
rejected  by  the  German  and  French  parliaments,  this 
extension  of protection  to  non-physical  persons  gradually 
asserted  itself  in  the  most  recent  laws,  in  Denmark, 
Luxemburg  and  Norway. 
We  show,  in  this  report,  that  the  extension of  the 
computing  laws  gives  rise  to  two  large  problems:  a 
conceptual  problem,  that  of  defining  protection  of  non-
physical  persons  in  terms  of principles,  and  the  problem 
of  interpretation  in  limiting  the  field  of  application of 
protection  of physical  persons  when  these  persons  are  not 
mentioned  by  name  in  the  files. 
The  first problem  has  not  been  solved  in  a  satisfactory 
manner  by  the  laws  currently passed  by  the  member 
countries.  We  have  suggested  that  it should  be 
considered  as  a  commercial  right,  and  not  as  a  human 
24 right  as  in  the  majority  of  current  laws.  If one  admits 
that  non-physical  persons,  and  particularly commercial 
agents,  have  a  legal  interest  in  keeping  a  strict control 
on  information  which  they  hold,  a  control  which  is  ruled 
by  the  customary  right  of  business  secrecy,  the  concept 
of privacy  in  the strict sense  can  apply  only  to  human 
beings,  and  not  to  companies  or  associations.  Thus  it 
seems  desirable  to  specify  a  purely  commercial  doctrine 
of  secrecy  and  disclosure  of  data  which  concerns 
commercial  activity,  and  particularly that of  commercial 
non-physical  persons,  in  order  to  avoid  in  future 
permanent  confusion  between  similar  but  distinct 
concepts,  which  one  sometimes  wrongly  treats  as  one.  If 
such  a  doctrine  developed,  and  if it could  be  operated  in 
Europe,  it is probable  that  one  could  assimilate  it to 
the principles  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  regarding  fair 
competition  (articles 85-86). 
The  second  problem  is  relatively easier  to  resolve. 
Whenever  connections  between  physical  and  non-physical 
persons  are  implicit  in  the  choice  of  the  information 
recorded  on  file,  it is  probable  that  the  laws  should 
apply  as  if the  file  referred  only  to  physical  persons. 
Anyway,  one  should  beware  of  a  gradual  extension  of  the 
field  of  application  of  the  laws  which  would  eventually 
take  away  their  purpose. 
Thus,  it is  necessary  that  future  developments  of  the 
laws  on  files  are  based  on  a  thorough  analysis  of  the 
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protection for  non-physical  persons.  Particularly  one 
should  distinguish  between  commercial  companies  and 
private associations,  and  also  consider  separately what 
protection  should  be  given  to  companies  in  the  public 
sector. 
Thus  we  say  in  this  report  that  future  research  should  be 
directed  towards  a  very  detailed  analysis  of  the  need  for 
protection  and  the  means  of  applying  it, especially as 
these  needs  should  be  based,  in  our  view,  on  the  Common 
Market's  economic  principles:  balance  of  competition,  and 
equity  in  commercial  relationships.  If this  should 
develop,  one  could  then  imagine  that  the  final  objective 
of  data protection  in  Europe  would  be  based  on  two 
complementary  principles:  the  protection  of  man  and  the 
citizen on  the  one  hand,  particularly with  regard  to 
files  of physical  persons;  the  protection of  'commercial' 
man  on  the  other  hand,  in what  concerns  the  non-physical 
person. 
This  is without  doubt  the  common  objective.  But  the 
means  of  access,  of  control,  and  of  enquiry will 
doubtless  be  different  for  physical  and  non-physical 
persons.  Today  one  is well  aware  of  the  means  which 
apply  to files of  physical  persons.  Several  years  more 
will  doubtless  be  needed  before  the  same  is  true  for  the 
files  of  non-physical  persons. 
26 4  International  economic  aspects of data protection 
4.1  It was  the  task of  section 4  to  evaluate  - as  far  as  this 
is possible  in  a  general  way  - the  cost of data 
protection on  a  national  level,  and  the  possibly  ensuing 
international distortion of competition.  Furthermore, 
appropriate harmonising  measures  were  to  be  identified 
which  could  reduce  the  cost of data protection,  and  in 
particular the  possibly  ensuing  international distortion 
of competition:  the  rights  and  interests of the  citizens 
concerned  were  to  be  taken  into account  especially. 
In  order  to clarify the  scope  of the  study,  it has  to  be 
stated that  section 4  concentrates  on  the  one  hand 
essentially on  the  cost of data protection in  the  sense 
of the  costs which  occur  because  of additional  data 
protection measures.  General  inefficiencies or 
opportunity costs  caused  by data protection  could  not  be 
dealt with  in detail within the  given  framework.  As  far 
as  the  issue of  international distortion of  competition 
is concerned,  it has  to be  stressed  on  the other hand 
that distortions of competition were  to be  discussed  only 
where  they are  caused  specifically by the  cost of data 
protection,  as  opposed  to  those  which  might  be  caused  by 
data protection in general. 
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examines  certain basic  concepts  of  economic  theory  in 
their relation to  the  data protection issue.  These  serve 
the  theoretical  evaluation  and  interpretation of  the  data 
protection cost  issue  and  present  suggestions  and 
starting-points  for  possible  follow-up  studies. 
Moreover,  certain theoretical  and  methodological 
difficulties  in  the  evaluation of costs  and  benefits  of 
data protection are dealt with,  and  the  general 
theoretical  concept  and  the  concrete methodological 
approach of section 4  are  explained. 
In view of  the  inadequacy  and  unreliability of  the 
available data,  section 4  refrains  almost  completely  from 
making  quantitative  statements,  and  concentrates  on 
qualitative arguments  and  results  on  the basis  of  figures 
provided by various  sources. 
4.3  In  section 4.3,  various  representative  estimates, 
studies,  and  experiences  from  different countries 
relating to  the  cost of data protection are critically 
reviewed  and  evaluated.  The  following  studies  or 
experiences  are dealt with  in  some  detail: 
Great Britain  (4.3.1):  the  Report  of  the  Committee  on 
Data Protection and  the  underlying  PACTEL  cost  study 
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model,  and  the  cost  survey of the Office of Management 
and  Budget  (OMB) 
Sweden  (4.3.3):  the  experience of the  Data  Inspection 
Board  (DIB)  with  the  Swedish  Data  Act 
Federal Republic of Germany  (4.3.4):  experience with 
the  Federal Data Protection Act. 
4.4  The  general  result of the  evaluation of the  various 
national  estimates  and  experiences  are  summarised  in 
section 4.4.  In  this  context the  unreliability of the 
existing - in particular quantitative - data  protection 
estimates,  and  the  ensuing  - in  tendency very 
considerable - overestimation of  (genuine)  data 
protection costs,  constitute the  main  finding  of the 
study.  This  holds  basically  for  the  overall data 
protection costs  and  for  the  individual  data protection 
items,  in particular  for  notification,  access,  data 
protection personnel,  registration  and  licensing,  data 
security,  and  opportunity costs. 
The  discrepancy between  these  findings  and  the  various  -
in part  extremely high  - data  protection cost  estimates 
can be  explained partly by the  interests  involved  as  far 
as  certain  comments  from  private  industry are  concerned, 
and  partly by otherwise-motivated overestimates of data 
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notification  and  access).  Yet  above  all,  cost-reducing 
factors  are  not  taken  into  account  adequately,  and  on  the 
other  hand  various  cost evaluations  (or  rather  estimates) 
charge  the  costs  of  various  measures  - especially  in  the 
security area  - incorrectly  and  in  violation  of  the 
principle  of  causality  to  data protection,  when  these 
measures  are  taken  - at least partly - on  account  of 
other  obligations  and  requirements,  and  particularly out 
of  the  self-interests of  the  data processing  body:  in 
cost  accounting,  it would  not  be  correct  to  consider 
these  as  data protection measures. 
Moreover,  the  genuine  data protection  costs,  which  under 
application of  correct principles  of  cost  accounting  are 
already  rather  insignificant,  are,  in  the  context  of  an 
overall evaluation  of  the  charges  which  data protection 
puts  on  the  personal  data  processing organisations,  to  be 
further  reduced  by  various  economies  and  other  benefits 
of  data protection.  Therefore  the  thus-defined  net 
charge  put  on  data  processing  organisations  by  data 
protection appears  in  the  end  to  be  generally  really 
marginal. 
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protection cost  issue,  section 4.5  deals with  the  issue 
of international distortion of competition caused  by data 
protection costs.  However,  as  already explained,  data 
protection costs are generally speaking  almost 
negligible,  and  in  any  case  too  small  to  have  a 
substantial effect on  the  competitive  strength of 
industry.  In  exceptional  cases  this  assessment  may 
possibly not be  valid to  the  same  extent,  but this does 
not  influence  the overall  judgement. 
Therefore,  the general  conclusion can  be  drawn,  that data 
protection costs  are  so  small  that they cause  no 
international distortion of competition.  Nor  do  certain 
relatively insignificant additional  charges,  which 
internationally operating  companies  (and multinational 
companies  in particular)  might  incur  because  they have  to 
cope  with various  differing national  data protection 
regulations,  add  up  to  substantial effects of distortion 
of competition due  to data protection costs.  In 
particular,  in  comparison with  other much  more  important 
international cost differences  (e.g.  in 
telecommunications  tariffs),  possible  international data 
protection cost differences  appear  negligible. 
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fees,  the  individual data  subject is generally not  harmed 
economicly by differences between  the various  national 
data protection regulations,  either. 
Yet it has  to be  recognised  that the  individual  is much 
more  hampered,  and  in practice  to  a  large  extent  even 
prevented,  from  exercising his data protection rights  on 
an  international  level,  than  is  the  case  for 
internationally operating  companies  with  various 
international bases  and  representations.  This,  however, 
is not really a  cost  issue but  a  factual  difficulty which 
obviously has  certain  economic  implications  {cost of 
legal  advice  on  international data protection, 
translation,  communication  costs  etc.)  as  soon  as  the 
person concerned tries seriously to  overcome  these 
difficulties. 
4.7  In conclusion,  section 4.6 lists various  elements  of 
European  data protection harmonisation  which  would  be 
favourable  for  the  citizen and  cost-effective at the  same 
time.  The  basic  reasoning  is that,  although  a  European 
data protection harmonising policy does  not  need  to 
concentrate  on  reducing  data protection costs  and  the 
corresponding distortion of competition  {because  the  data 
protection costs  are generally negligible,  and 
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of  no  practical  relevance),  the  active  and  uniform 
realisation of  the  legitimate  data protection objectives 
on  an  international  level  has  to  be  striven for  with  the 
greatest possible efficiency. 
In. particular,  in  the  realisation  of  the  ambitious 
concept  of  the  European  Parliament  for  a  directive  on  the 
harmonisation  of  legislation  on  data protection  to 
provide  citizens of  the  Community  with  the  maximum 
protection,  the  following  principles  must  be  taken  into 
account  for  reasons  of  efficiency:  uniformity, 
simplicity,  stability,  predictability and  the  granting  of 
adequate  intervals  for  transition  and  adaptation. 
The  introduction  on  a  European  level  of  a  basically 
uniform obligation  to  register  and  licence personal  data 
files  or  applications  seems  to  be  equally  important  in 
the  long  run.  Moreover,  the  introduction of  a  national 
data protection authority  in  each  country  appears  on  the 
one  hand  to  be  the  logical  complement  to  a  registration 
and  licensing  scheme,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  be 
necessary  for  the  efficient  implementation  of  national 
data protection  regulations  and  international  harmonising 
directives. 
In  particular  on  an  international  level,  the  individual 
should  enjoy  broadened  notification  and  access  rights  (as 
far  as  possible  free  of  charge),  especially  in  order  to 
33 reduce  the  financial  and  other difficulties the 
individual  encounters  in exercising his  data protection 
rights.  The  issue of strict data protection liability 
should  also be  dealt with  uniformly  on  a  European  level, 
and  favourably  for  the  citizen. 
4.8 At  present,  it is  impossible  to  evaluate  even 
approximately the  cost of European  data protection 
harmonisation.  However,  such  costs  should  presumably  not 
be  a  major  issue if harmonisation  is realised  roughly  on 
the  lines discussed  above. 
4.9 Finally,  section 4.7  identifies possible subjects  for 
future  economicly oriented data protection research.  The 
following  issues  appear  specifically to  need  further 
investigation  as  a  basis  for  the  elaboration of  European 
data protection directives: 
practical  implications  and  costs of  the  public  data 
protection supervisory authorities  (European 
Community,  Scandinavia,  Austria,  Canada),  and 
estimation of the  corresponding  implications  and  costs 
of  European  data protection harmonisation  (including 
financing  schemes) 
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statistics covering  on  a  coherent  basis  the practical 
implications  and  costs  etc.  due  to  the  various 
national  data protection  regulations  (private  sector) 
practical  economic  implications  (cost  etc.)  of 
international data protection  regulations  in_specific 
sectors of  industry  (address  vendors/direct  mail, 
banking  and  insurance,  credit  reporting etc.,  computer 
bureaux  and  data  bank  vendors  etc.)  with  special 
regard  to  American  sectoral  data  protection 
regulations 
study  of  the  harmonisation  issue  on  the  level  of  state 
data protection  regulations within  and  between  the  USA 
and  Canada  (with  special  regard  to  economic  aspects) 
the  issue  of  de  facto  distortions  of  international 
competition  due  to data protection 
practical  implications  and  problems  of  international 
data protection  regulations  with  regard  to  internal 
communications  of  multinational  companies  and  groups 
(particularly  in  the  areas  of  clients,  marketing, 
financial  and  personnel  data) 
function  of  data protection  as  an  integral part of 
efficient data  resource  management  at  company  level 
experience  regarding  the  practical  implications  and 
costs  of  various  international  Freedom  of  Information 
regulations  (Sweden,  USA,  Canada  etc.) 
practical  and  economic  aspects  of  the  data protection 
issue  with  regard  to  new  electronic  information  and 
communication  technologies 
35 data protection,  personal profiles,  automatic 
decision-making,  administrative  and  technical  control 
technologies. 
Apart  from  economic  research parallel  to  the  elaboration 
and  implementation  of  European  data  protection 
directives,  and  the  study of  economic  aspects  of the 
legal person data  protection  issue,  it is  above  all the 
general  policy issue of the  legal  framework  of  a  future 
European  common  data  and  information market  which  is of 
decisive  importance.  In  view of the  European 
infrastructure which  is currently being  put  up  in  the 
data  network  and  data  bank  area,  and  the  European 
information  industry  evolving  on  this basis,  the 
following  specific  research  items  are  proposed: 
data  and  information liability or guarantee with 
respect to permanent  availability,  quality etc.  of 
data banks  services  etc. 
proprietary rights with  respect  to  electronic  data  and 
information,  as  well  as  services  and  products  based  on 
these 
rights  of access  and  use  by  individuals  and 
organisations  of data  banks,  data  networks, 
applications  software,  interpretational  knowhow  etc. 
private or public organisation of  infrastructures  in 
the  area of information  technology,  information, 
resources,  information  industries  etc. 
36 legal  issues of authentification and  evidence with 
respect  to  electronic data etc. 
private or governmental  rights of access  and 
inspection with  respect  to data banks  etc.  (e.g.  as 
legal  evidence,  checking  of data  and  interpretative or 
decision-assisting programs,  publication of 
cryptographic  transmission  codes  etc.). 
37 5  Technical  aspects  of  the  right  of  access 
In  most  data privacy  laws  one  can  find  two  distinct  and 
almost  contradictory  aspects:  the  first  one  deals  with 
the  right of  secrecy,  the  second  with  the  right of 
knowledge.  The  right  of  secrecy consists  in preventing 
an  excessive divulgation  of  information  concerning 
private  individuals.  The  right  of  knowledge  consists  in 
giving  a  private  individual  free  access  to  the 
information  about  himself  that  is  stored  by  a  third 
person. 
From  the  very  beginning  of  EDP,  technical  means  were 
developed  that  helped  to  enforce  the  right  of  secrecy 
{data  security,  protection  systems,  encryption,  etc.). 
Even  though  these  means  were  not  developed  for  this 
specific purpose,  they  are  now  available  for  the 
enforcement  of  this  aspect  of  legislation.  But  no 
technical  tools  have  been  developed  for  the  right  of 
knowledge.  In  this  study,  we  try  to  understand  the 
technical  implications  of  this  right. 
Since  this  study  is concerned  with  the  impact  of 
legislation on  technical  developments,  it is  necessary  to 
start by  a  better  understanding  of  the  technical  state of 
the art.  We  therefore  present  a  brief  overview  of  future 
evolution  in  the  computer  field.  We  divide  this  field  in 
three parts:  information  storage,  information  processing 
and  information  communication,  and  describe  successively 
38 the  hardware  and  software  evolution  in  these  three  areas: 
large public  networks,  local  networks,  mass  storage 
(traditional  technology,  new  technology,  digital 
videodisc,  database  machines),  software  engineering,  word 
processing  and  the  general  standardization effort.  The 
conclusion  of  this brief  survey  is  that  (1)  more  data 
will  be  stored,  (2)  the  structure  of  this data will  grow 
more  and  more  complex. 
Having  defined  the  technological  perspective  of  our 
study,  we  then  move  to describe  more  precisely  the  right 
of  access.  We  decompose  this  right  into  four  parts: 
Right  1:  The  right  of  the  public  to  be  aware  of  the 
existence  of all files. 
Right  2:  The  right  of  the  individual  to  be  aware  of  the 
existence  of  information  held  on  him  in  a  given 
file. 
Right  3:  The  right  of  an  individual  to  know  the  content 
of  the  information  concerning  him  in  a  given 
file. 
Right  4:  The  right  of  an  individual  to  ask  for  the 
correction of data  concerning  him  whenever 
necessary. 
Then  we  study  the  actual  implementation  of  each  of  these 
rights. 
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adequate  solution.  Then  we  explain  that different 
solutions  can  be  envisaged,  and  that  they  are 
characterized  by: 
(i)  the  number  of  information  centres  (is 
there  a  central  one  or  several 
distribution points?) 
(ii)  the  types  of  information  centres  (is 
there  just  one  type  or  are  they  organized 
by  sector?) 
(iii)  the  information  storage  medium  and  the 
means  of  access  to  that  information 
(iv)  and  last but  not  least,  the  content  of 
that  information. 
Instead  of  choosing  one  optimal  solution,  we  give  a 
number  of  elements  that must  be  taken  into  consideration 
for  this  choice,  and  we  study  the  implication  of  each  of 
these. 
Right  2:  After  showing  that  this  right  is distinct  from 
right 1,  we  distinguish  two  different  approaches  to  a 
solution:  the  notification  method  and  the  information 
centre  method. 
We  study  the  different  problems  in  the  notification 
method:  periodicity of  notification;  the  confidentiality 
problem due  to  the  large  flow  of  data  generated  by  this 
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11implicit notification  .. 
and  show  its scope  and  limits. 
The  information  centre  method  is  then  studied,  together 
with  the  confidentiality problems  that  it generates. 
Right  3:  In  this  case  again,  two  different  approaches 
can  be  distinguished:  the  query  method  (the  data  subject 
asks  the  responsible  keeper)  and  the  notification method 
(the  responsible  keeper  voluntarily notifies  the  data 
subject).  In  fact  these  two  methods  differ  only  in  the 
first phase  (query  initiation),  after  which  they  have  a 
common  phase  in  which  the  system  owner  must  communicate 
the  information  to  the  data  subject. 
Therefore  we  first  study  the  query  initiation process  and 
show  that  it is closely  related  to  the  enforcement  of 
right 1:  the  more  precise  the  system description,  the 
more  precise will  the  query  formulation  be. 
We  decompose  the  process  for  answering  the  data  subject's 
query  into  three  steps:  (1)  defining  the  information 
relating  to  the  data  subject,  (2)  retrieving  that 
information,  (3)  communicating  it.  In  order  to  give  a 
full  description  of  the  problems  raised  by  these  three 
steps,  we  first outline  the  various  components  of  an 
information  system.  We  show  that  information  in  such  a 
system  can exist  in  three  forms:  the  basic data  (the 
files  themselves),  the  auxiliary data  (for  security  and 
performance  purposes),  the  application programs. 
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essential part of  the  right  of  access  but  a  natural 
consequence.  We  show  that  a  major  problem  is  that  of 
correction propagation,  because  of  its cost  and  its 
possible  threat  to  data  confidentiality. 
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6.1  Purpose  and  form  of  the  inspection 
Much  has  been  written  about  data protection  laws,  but 
little about  how  they  could  be  enforced.  Indeed,  people 
have  said  that it would  be  easy  to  evade  such  laws 
without  being  caught,  and  therefore  that  they  are  bound 
to  be  ineffective. 
The  present  study  has  been  concerned  with  the  means  of 
checking  whether  a  system which  uses  personal  data 
complies  with  a  data protection  law.  Such  a  means  would 
not  only  help  enforce  the  law:  it could  also tell  the 
conscientious data  user  if  and  where  his  system  needed 
improvement.  It would  thus  support  the  law  in  a 
practical positive  way,  and  give  confidence  to  the  public 
that  their  interests were  safeguarded. 
The  envisaged  form  of  the  inspection  is  this  in  outline: 
A decision  is made  to  inspect  a  particular  system.  (If 
it is  a  statutory  inspection  in pursuit  of  the  law,  this 
decision  may  be  made  by  a  Data Protection Authority;  but 
an organisation  may  decide  on  a  voluntary  inspection  of 
one  of  its own  data  systems.)  An  inspector  (possibly 
more  than  one  person)  is appointed.  He  collects 
information  about  the  system  which  is to  be  checked, 
mostly  during  a  visit to  the  place  where  it is operated. 
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operate  the  system,  and  examines  different parts of  it. 
He  writes  a  report presenting his  conclusions  on  the 
compliance  of  the  system with  the  data protection  law. 
6.2  Adaptability of  the  inspection  procedure 
Different data protection  laws  and  proposed  laws  contain 
a  great  variety  of  legal  requirements.  It might  appear 
that  an  inspection procedure  must  be  directly related  to 
the particular  law,  compliance  with  which  is  being 
checked. 
Similarly,  systems  using  personal  data  are  very  various 
in size,  complexity,  mode  of  operation,  and  in  the 
sensitivity of  the  data  they  contain. 
Another  factor  which  must  affect  the  inspection procedure 
is  the  thoroughness  which  is  required.  Perhaps  most 
systems  do  not  pose  a  great  threat  to  their  data 
subjects;  for  these,  a  fairly  superficial  and  economical 
check  may  be  appropriate.  But  there  are  systems  which, 
because  of  their  size,  the  sensitivity of  the  data  they 
contain,  the  concentration of  power  which  they  represent, 
or  the  public  concern  which  they  attract,  justify a 
searching  and  unlimited  investigation. 
If each  of  these  factors  (as  well  as  the  statutory/voluntary 
possibility mentioned  in  the  previous  section)  required 
different  inspection procedures,  the  whole  subject  would  be 
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inspection procedure  can  accommodate  all data protection 
requirements,  suit any data  system,  and  be  as  exhaustive  or 
superficial  as  circumstances  require.  Different parts  of  the 
procedure  can  be  omitted if they are  not  relevant,  and 
carried out  thoroughly  or partially as  appropriate. 
6.3  Data  protection requirements 
All  data protection  requirements  whose  observance  the 
inspector may  have  to  check  can  be  analysed  under  these 
headings: 
- notifications: 
- particulars of the  system must  be  disclosed  to: 
- the Data Protection Authority 
- the data  subjects 
- the  public 
-the contents of  a  data  subject's record  must  be 
disclosed  to  him  in  a  form  which  the  layman  can 
understand 
- a  licensing or  registration  fee  may  be  required 





- not misleading 
- up-to-date 
45 - the data  processes  must  be  legitimate: 
- the  purposes  of the  system must  be  acceptable 
- the  individual  processes  in  the  system must  be  fair  to 
all  interested parties 
- the  processes must  be carried out without  error 
- there must  be  no  access  to personal data other  than  for 
approved  purposes 
- the personnel  who  operate  the  system must  be  informed  of 
their data protection responsibilities,  and  given  the 
means  and  encouragement·  to carry them  out 
- there  should  be  controls  in  the data  system to provide 
checks  on  its working,  so  that malfunctions  of  any  sort 
can  be  detected,  and,  if appropriate,  overcome. 
These  requirements  can  be  expanded  into  a  set of measures 
that the  system  should  perform,  with  corresponding 
checkpoints  which  the  inspector  can  investigate. 
6.4  The  inspection procedure 
Usually the  inspector will  contact  the  person  responsible 
for  the  system beforehand,  to  agree  an  outline plan  for  the 
inspection,  and  to  ask  for  preliminary information. 
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reason  to  suspect  a  serious  breach  of  the  data protection 
regulations,  which  must  be  stopped  quickly,  or  for  which 
the  evidence  may  disappear  if the  inspection  is delayed. 
The  inspector  will  use  the  preliminary  information  to 
plan  his on-site  inspection.  In  principle  he  may  inspect 
all parts  of  the  system  to  check  compliance  with  all 
aspects  of  the  requirements  referred  to  in  the  previous 
section,  but  usually  he  will  select parts  and  aspects 
which  in his  opinion  are  important. 
When  the  inspector  has  analysed  the  information  which  he 
has  collected,  he  writes  a  report stating his  findings  on 
the  degree  of  compliance  of  the  system  with  the  data 
protection  regulations.  He  may  make  recommendations  and 
give  advice  (either  informally during  his  inspection 
visit,  or  in his  report)  on  how  the  system  could  and 
should  be  improved  from  the  point  of  view  of  data 
protection,  but  only  in  a  way  which  does  not  compromise 
his  independence. 
The  inspection  report  should  be  shown  to  the  person 
responsible  for  the  system  unless  this might  prejudice 
legal proceedings  against  him;  in  any  case  he  should  be 
told  the  main  findings.  There  is  a  case  of  publishing 
the  report,  with  exclusions  to protect  the  data user's 
necessary  secrets. 
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The  inspector  requires  the  following qualities: 
- understanding  of  data protection 
- experience  in  the  way  human  beings  in  organisations 
work 
- knowledge  of  the  technology  used  in  the  system 
- general  inspection skills 
- trustworthiness. 
No  existing profession  demands  all  these,  and  people 
possessing  them  are  rare. 
A statutory  inspection  team  should  normally  consist of 
more  than  one  person,  to  provide  a  spread  of  the 
necessary qualities,  to  allow  them  to  check  each  other, 
and  to  increase  the  objectivity of  the  inspection. 
Particulary  in  a  statutory  inspection,  the  inspector 
needs  special  powers  to  obtain  information,  and  he  must 
be  clearly given  these  powers  and  supported  in exercising 
them.  In  some  cases  he  may  be  exposed  to  various 
pressures  to distort his  judgement,  and  must  be  supported 
against  them.  But  there  must  be  a  means  of  complaint 
against  an  inspector  who  has  exceeded  or  misused  his 
powers,  or  made  a  mistake. 
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This  examination  of  the  inspection process  has  shown  that 
all  the  legal  requirements  for  data protection  can  be 
inspected,  has  suggested  a  practical  set  of  steps  for 
checking  compliance,  and  has  produced  no  reason  for 
believing  that  serious  breaches  of  the  law  would  be  easy 
to  operate without  detection. 
The  public  concern  over  the  uses  of  personal  data,  which 
has  led  to  data protection  laws,  justifies the  existence 
of  a  substantial,  effective  and  visible  inspection 
activity. 
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7.1  General  observations 
The  EEC  has  been  quick  to  realise  the  importance  of 
information  technology  and  its  impact  on  the  handling  of 
personal  data,  as  well  as  possible  consequences  for  the 
individual  and  the  Common  Market.  The  whole  area  has 
been  of  such  vital  importance  in social,  political, 
economic  and  legal  ways  that  an  initial study of  it 
seemed  to  be  necessary.  This  was  even  more  urgent,  since 
the  technical  and  regulatory  environment  was  constantly 
changing. 
To  find  out  where  to  start  and  which  way  to  take  in  this 
environment,  this pilot project has  been  launched,  with 
the  hope  of  providing  some  signposts  in  the  present 
confusion.  But  a  framework  for  a  long-range  fundamental 
approach  was  also  needed.  With  this  double  motivation, 
of providing  a  closer  view  of  some  present  problems  and 
forming  a  framework  on  which  a  systematic  approach  to  the 
social,  political  and  legal  implications  of data 
processing  could  be  based,  we  selected,  with  the  help  of 
the  Committee  of National  Experts,  several  topics  which, 
separate  from  each  other  as  they  might  seem,  nevertheless 
turned  out  to  be  closely connected. 
The  chosen  problems  reflected  main  issues  of  debate  at 
the  beginning  of  this  study,  and  drew  attention  to  basic 
conflicts  and  structural  problems  on  the  level  of 
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- the  solution  (regulation)  area,  and 
- the  economic  environment. 
On  the  level of the  problem  area,  the  issue of 
transborder data  flow  (section 1)  was  chosen both  as 
being  the  starting-point of present international 
regulation activities  and  as  being  representative of  one 
of the most  contentious  elements  of existing  legislation. 
Our  main  interest has  been  to  arrive  at  a  better 
understanding  of this  complex  area  and  to  find  some 
criteria for  structuring it.  After  a  panorama  of  the 
most  relevant  environments  in which  this traffic takes 
place,  we  produced  a  classification according  to  the 
physical  means  of transmission,  the  people  involved  in 
it,  the  nature of the  information  transmitted,  the  nations 
involved,  and  the  regulations applicable  to this 
exchange.  We  have  outlined  the  enormous  difficulties of 
obtaining quantitative data,  but  we  have  also  identified 
possible ways  of getting this data.  Similar results  were 
described  for  the measurement  and  evaluation of 
transborder data  flows. 
On  the  level  of solution  (regulation),  we  started  from 
the present discussion  on  the practicability of certain 
data protection models  and  the  proposals  discussed  by the 
European Parliament  which  have  now  become  recommendations. 
51 This  led  us  to  a  closer  look at the  structure  and 
practice of data protection agencies  (section  2},  and  to 
questions  of legislation  (the  natural  person/other  legal 
entity problem:  section  3}  and  technical  feasibility 
(right of access:  section 5,  control procedures: 
section 6}. 
With  regard  to the data protection agencies,  we  have  been 
able  to put  together  the  legislative material  on  the 
environment  in which  these organisations have  to operate 
and  the  evidence  which  we  have  collected  on  the practice 
which has  already developed.  From  this  evidence  we  have 
drawn  conclusions  about  the political  impact of these 
organisations  and  their possible role  in  international 
co-operation.  We  assume  that these  agencies  deserve  and 
will  receive  further  study,  both because  it is  in  them 
that actual  experience  accumulates,  and  because  of their 
importance  for  transborder  data  flow. 
On  the  natural person/other  legal  entities problem,  we 
have  outlined major  difficulties:  ensuring  that the 
intended protection  is  actually achieved,  and  defining 
exactly the  scope  of appropriate  regulations.  We  have 
suggested  that  solutions  for  the  first problem  should  be 
sought  through business  law,  rather  than  from  human 
rights  which  constitute  the  underlying  values  of  the data 
protection discussion  for  natural  persons.  With  regard 
to the  second difficulty,  we  have  suggested  that whenever 
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entities,  data protection  regulations  should  apply.  We 
have  stated,  however,  that  when  these  other  legal entities 
are  involved,  there  may  be  confusion  with  aims  of  data 
policy other  than  those  of  data  privacy. 
Regarding  the  right  of  access  as  one  of  the  most  important 
practical  tools  of  data protection,  we  have  looked  into  the 
technical  feasibility  and  convenience  of  these  rights  in 
the  light of  technological  advances.  We  have  identified 
several  elements  of  that  right,  and  found  that  there  is 
danger  that  some  of  these  elements  may  have  effects  which 
are  adverse  to privacy  and  security,  and  that  therefore  any 
software  or  hardware  to  be  developed  for  carrying  out  the 
right  of  access  must  take  into  account  these  risks,  and 
should  also  reflect  the  nature  of  man-machine  relations. 
On  the  question  of  control,  of  whether  compliance  with 
data protection  laws  can  actually  be  checked,  we  have 
tried  to  describe  the  basic  notions  of  such  procedures, 
and  have  arrived at  some  fundamental  elements  of  such 
procedures  which  are  independent  of  the  regulation 
environment. 
This  has  confirmed  our  general  observation,  that  though 
solutions  may  giffer  in  the  particular  approach  according 
to  legal,  social  and  political  traditions,  a  great 
likeness  can  be  observed  in  the  way  in  which  industrialised 
states have  set out  to  deal  with  the  problems  which 
information  technologies  pose  for  data privacy. 
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economic  environment,  which  we  have  analysed  in  section  4 
in  examining  the  economic  problems  caused  by  applying 
these  technologies  in  these  societies.  We  have  concluded 
that  the  cost problem of  data protection  must  be  examined 
with  greater  care,  since  most  of  the  assessments  made  so 
far  are  only  speculations;  and  that  there  is  considerable 
manoeuvering  space  for  forthcoming  international 
regulations. 
So,  although  the  areas  selected  may  seem  miscellaneous, 
they  identify  and  analyse  t~e most  crucial points of 
information  control  in  modern  society,  and  present 
exempl~ry features  of data protection  both  in  its 
national  and  international  environment. 
But  in  the  course  of  our  observation  we  have  come  across 
further  problems,  partly arising  from  the  points  we  have 
analysed,  partly  from  the  system  in  which  they  are 
incorporated.  Before  dealing  with  these  consequences,  we 
have  a  closer  look  at  the  infrastructure  of  this  study 
itself. 
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Co-operation  on  this  study  has  been  a  valuable  experience 
in  the  area  of  joint research.  This  positive  experience 
makes  us  wish  to  enlarge  the  field  of  co-operation with 
other  similar  research  institutes  in  the  EEC.  The 
multidisciplinary  approach  particularly,  and  the 
possibility of  following  research  results  in  English, 
French  and  German,  have  proved  most  valuable  for  such  a 
project. 
In  particular,  one  of  the  main  objectives  of  this  study 
was  to  create  a  basis  for  co-operation  between  the 
participating  research  institutes of  the  Community.  In 
fact,  even  during  the  conceptual  and  contractual  stages 
this project  had  been  a  joint effort. 
Looking  back  now  at  these  nearly  two  years  of  co-
operation  on  the  actual  project  and  our  research 
experiences,  we  believe  that  the  wide-ranging  approach 
outlined  in  7.1  could  not  have  been  followed  by  one 
national  research  institute alone.  This  was  not  because 
of  the  means  required,  which  were  rather  modest,  but  for 
deeper  reasons: 
First of  all,  the  problems  of  information  technology 
arise  on  an  international  level.  So  only  by  an 
55 international  research  strategy could  the  different 
sources  of  information  be  made  sufficiently available  and 
be  adequately  accessed.  Secondly,  the  multidisciplinary 
qualifications provided  by  the  different  institutes made 
it possible  to  look  into  these  problems  from  different 
angles.  Finally,  the  differences  in  the  research 
environments  and  traditions  have  shown  us  that  in spite 
of  these  national  differences,  similar  means  of  approach 
to  solving  the  problems  are  valid. 
So  co-operation  was  achieved,  which  both  maintained 
national  characteristics  and .yet  joined  in  a  common 
effort  to produce  a  framework  for  analysing  and 
evaluating  the  impact  of  information  technology  on 
personal  data. 
Positive  though  these  experiences  have  been,  there  are 
still several  items  that  we  would  like  to  see  achieved  in 
any  further  similar  ventures. 
One  of  the difficulties of  such  co-operation  is  that it 
demands  a  high  co-ordination effort  by  the participating 
institutes.  Though  we  think  that  by  now  an  efficient 
substructure  of  co-operation  between  the  institutes  and 
the  Commission  has  been  achieved,  it must  be  kept  in  mind 
that  we  have  often  been  in  a  position  where  we  had  to 
follow  legislatory and  political events  rather  than  to 
help prepare  them,  because  of  the  time  which  would  have 
been  consumed  in  creating  a  structure  for  co-operation. 
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provided  results  more  fluently.  We  feel  certain that  we 
could  then  provide  the  Commission,  as  well  as  the 
Committee  of  National  Experts,  the  member  countries  and 
other  interested parties,  with  the  kind  of  help which  is 
needed  during  the  preparation of decisions.  We  suggest 
that,  if there  are  further  activities of  this  type,  means 
and  organisational  structures  should  be  developed  to  give 
joint study  groups  more  time  to  work  together  in  the  same 
environment,  rather  than  only  to  meet  occasionally. 
Now  that  we  know  how  to  work  together,  we  feel  that  the 
time  has  come  to  ask  other  research  institutes within  the 
Community  who  have  similar  interests  to  join further 
ventures.  We  believe  this  can  only  help  to  broaden  and 
deepen  the  study. 
On  the  basis  of  these  deliberations  and  from  our  joint 
efforts,  we  offer  some  proposals  for  further  research. 
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Although  data protection legislation has  reached  a  stage 
of  consolidation  on  both 'the  national  and  the 
international  levels,  we  still observe  several  issues 
which  may  become  of  crucial  importance  for  the  free  flow 
of  information  in  the  Community  and  for  safeguarding  EEC 
citizens for  whom  national  legislation  was  put  forward: 
1.  Nations  with  data protection  legislation can  review 
it in  the  light of  the  experience  of  their  data 
inspection  agencies  and  public  opinion.  This  seems  to 
lead  to  the  exemption  of  trivial data processing,  and 
to easier  procedures  for  the  commonest  data  banks 
which  contain data  that  does  not  seem  dangerous.  At 
the  same  time,  a  more  careful  approach  is  being  made 
to  specify  sectors  of  data processing  like public 
health,  social  security,  employment  agencies,  research 
and  national  security.  Among  these  sectors,  all 
except  perhaps  the  last deserve  the  attention  of  the 
EEC,  since  it is  not  altogether  clear  what 
consequences  this  more  sectoral  approach  will  have. 
2.  Though  international  regulations  have  been  drafted,  it 
is  not  clear  when  and  how  the  different  nations  will 
respond  to  them,  and  how  practical  they  will  prove  in 
day-to-day  data  traffic.  This  is  of  especial 
importance  with  regard  to data  traffic  between  EEC  and 
non-EEC  countries.  This  uncertainty  is partly due  to 
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based  on  assumptions  rather  than  conclusions.  Here 
the actual practice and  decisions of the data 
protection agencies  on  transborder  data  flow will  be 
of vital  importance. 
3.  The  scope  of data protection has  grown  widely  in 
recent discussions.  Issues  like the  balance  of  power, 
employment,  national  sovereignty,  freedom  of 
information,  the  'New  World  Information Order'  and 
economic  dependency have  been  closely mingled  with  the 
former  issues of privacy  and  openness.  This 
enlargement of issues has  led  to  controversies  on  data 
protection issues,  and  has  widened  the  considerations 
for  regulations  to  non-physical  legal  entities,  as 
well  as  to  economic  data.  The  consequences  of these 
complications  for  existing data protection regulation, 
and  for  the  whole  issue  of  information  as  an  economic 
good  have  not yet been sufficiently analysed. 
4.  While  regulation activities have  reached  some  degree 
of consolidation,  technological  development  has  not 
stopped.  It is still dubious  how  existing  national 
and  international  regulations  can  react to  new 
developments  like satellite communication  and  micro-
computers. 
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more  far-reaching  proposals  for  regulating  information 
flows  and  giving  undue  protectionism that  must  not  be 
ignored  in  further  policy-making.  This  applies  mainly 
to  the  recommendations  of  the  European  Parliament,  but 
also  to  further  activities of  the  Council  of  Europe  in 
the  area  of  access  to  government  data.  Wherea~ the 
former  poses  legal  and  organisational  problems  whose 
extent  remains  to  be  analysed,  the  latter  may  become 
important  to present data protection  regulations,  and 
may  pose  problems  of  competition,  as  experiences  with 
the u.s.  Freedom  of  Information  Act  suggest. 
6.  Furthermore,  the  economic  consequences  of  the  drafted 
and  proposed  international  agreements  are  far  from 
being  clear  and  demand  further  study. 
7.  Another  issue  which  has  been  observed,  but  not 
explored,  during  the  present  study,  is  the  influence 
of  tariffs and  regulatory  aspects  of 
telecommunications  in  the  development  of  information 
flows. 
These  uncertainties  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  experience 
with  our  interdisciplinary  international  research  team  on 
the  other,  lead  us  to  suggestions  for  further  research. 
We  have  identified  the  following  research  topics: 
60 1.  Technical  problems  of  ensuring  privacy,  and  data 
protection  problems  arising  from  new  technologies 
2.  Data  protection  rights  of  the  EEC  citizen 
3.  Data  protection  and  organisational policy 
4.  Possible  role  and  structure of  a  European  data 
protection control  body 
5.  Economic  aspects  of  harmonization  procedures 
6.  Protection of  research  data 
7.  Transferability of  data  protection models 
B.  Assessment  of  information policy  and  legal  problems 
with  regard  to  telecommunications  and  data  flows 
between  EEC  and  non-EEC  countries. 
61 7.4  Acknowledgement 
The  authors  of  this  study  wish  to  thank  all  the  numerous 
individuals  and  institutions  who  have  helped  with  their 
free  information  and  advice. 
62 Contents  of section 1 
1.0  Introduction 
1.0.0  Foreword 
1.0.1  Aim 
1.0.2  Methodology of the  survey 
1.0.3  Analysis  of  the  results 
1.1  TBDF:  general presentation 
1.1.0  Introduction 
1.1.1  Computer  networks 
1.1.1.1  Batch  processing 
1.1.1.2  Timesharing  networks 
1.1.2  Specialised networks 
1.1.2.1  SITA:  the airlines  network 
1.1.2.2  SWIFT 
1.1.2.3  EUREX 
1.1.3  International business  and  the  management  of 
large  groups 
1.1.3.1  Management  of  accounts  and  finance 
1.1.3.2  Management  of production  and  stocks 
1.1.3.3  Purchase,  sales  and  delivery orders 
1.1.3.4  Statistics and  commercial  forecasts 
1.1.3.5  Research  and  development 
1.1.3.6  Exploitation of  a  centralised file 
1.1.4  Hotel  and  travel bookings,  car hire 
1.1.5  The  press 
1.1.5.1  Associated Press 
1.1.5.2  Reuters 
1.1.6  The  Preparation of data  and  transfer of  programs 
1.1.6.1  Data preparation 
1.1.6.2  Program  transfers 
1.1.·7  Scientific and  technical  cooperation 
1.1.7.1  Meteorological  forecasts:  the  World 
Meteorological Organisation 
1.1.7.2  An  example  of collaboration  in  computing:  EIN 
1.1.7.3  Some  examples  of data  banks 
1.1.8  Data  banks  and  data  bases 
1.1.8.1  The  American  systems:  DIALOG  and  ORBIT 
1.1.8.2  The  European  Space  Agency 
1.1.8.3  The  EURONET  network 
1.1.8.4  DATA  RESOURCES  Inc. 
1.1.8.5  CHASE  ECONOMETRICS 
1.1.9  Administrative  and  governmental  data  flows 
1.2  Classification of TBDF 
1.2.0  Introduction 
1.2.1  Criteria of classification 
1.2.2  Transfer  medium 
1.2.3  The  character of the  operator 
1.2.4  The  nature of  the  information carried 
1.2.5  Direction of the  exchanges 
1.2.6  Commercial  and  non-commercial  flows 
1.2.7  Material  flows:  postal  and  customs  position 
1.2.8  Non-material  flows:  the  telecommunications 
regulatory administration 
63 1.3  The  amount  of TBDF 
1.3.1  Interest  in  the  amount  of data  flows 
1.3.2  Difficulties  encountered  during  the  survey 
1.3.3  Some  quantitative aspects  of  TBDF 
1.3.4  The  basic problem:  evaluation of data  flows 
1.3.4.1  Measure  of  volume 
1.3.4.2  Measure  of value 
1.4  Conclusion 
1.5  Bibliography 
1.5.1  Legal  aspects  of  transborder  data  flows 
1.5.2  OECD  documents 
1.5.3  Networks  and  transborder  data  flows 
1.5.4  Data  banks,  information retrieval  networks 
1.5.5  Telecommunications  satellites 
1.5.6  UNESCO  documents 
1.5.7  Other  interesting  sources 
64 Contents  of section 2 
2.0  Introduction 
2.0.1  Definition of the  item 
2.0.2  Scheme  of  the  report  and  methodological  problems 
2.1  Control authorities  seen  in  the  content  of national  data 
protection  laws  and  draft  laws  of  the European  Community 
2.1.0  Preliminary  remarks 
2.1.1  Belgium 
2.1.1.1  Present  legislative position 
2.1.1.2  Data  protection  law  as  a  context  to  the  control  authority 
2.1.1.3  Control  authority 
2.1.2  Denmark 
2.1.2.1  Present  legislative position 
2.1.2.2  Data  protection  law  as a  context  to  the  control authority 
2.1.2.3  Control  authority 
2.1.3  France 
2.1.3.1  Present  legislative position 
2.1.3.2  Data  protection  law  as  a  context  to  the  control  authority 
2.1.3.3  Control  authority 
2.1.4  United Kingdom 
2.1.4.1  Legislative  position 
2.1.4.2  Data  protection  law  as  a  context  to  the  control authority 
2.1.4.3  Control  authority 
2.1.5  Ireland and  Italy 
2.1w6  Luxemburg 
2.1.6.1  Present  legislative position 
2.1.6.2  Data  protection  law  as  a  context  to  the  control  authority 
2.1.6.3  Control  authority 
2.1.7  The  Netherlands 
2.1.7.1  Present  legislative position 
2.1.7.2  Data  protection  law  as a  context  to  the  control  authority 
2.1.7.3  Control  authority 
2.2  Data  pro~ection authorities in  the German  Federal Republic  and 
Sweden 
2.2.0  Introduction 
2.2.1  The  data  protection  system of  the German  Federal Republic 
2.2.1.1  The  federal  structure  of  the  system 
2.2.1.2  Control authorities and  the  Federal Data Protection Law 
2.2.1.2.1  Present  legislative position 
2.2.1.2.2  Data  protection  law  as  a  context  for  the  Federal 
Commissioner  for Data Protection  and  the  supervisory 
authorities 
2.2.1.2.3  Control  authorities 
65 2.2.1.3  Control  authority  for  the Hesse Land  data  protection  law 
(HDSG) 
2.2.1.3.1  Present  legislative position 
2.2.1.3.2  The  data protection  law  as a  context  to  the  control 
authority 
2.2.1.3.3  Control  authority 
2.2.2  The  Swedish  data  protection authority  and  its context  of data 
protection  law 
2.2.2.1  Present  legislative position 
2.2.2.2  Data  protection  law  as  a  context  to  the  control authority 
2.2.2.3  Control  authority 
2.3  Role  and  significance of the  data  protection authorities 
2.3.0  Introduction 
2.3.1  Analysis  problems 
2.3.1.1  Problems  of comparability 
2.3.1.2  Problems  of classification and  evaluation 
2.3.2  Role  and  significance in  the  national  sphere 
2.3.2.1  Control authorities as  a  new  type  of administration 
2.3.2.2  Functions  of  the  control authorities 
2.3.2.3  Political significance of  the  control authorities 
2.3.3  Role  and  significance in  the  international  sphere 
2.3.3.1  Control  authorities  and  transborder  data  flow 
2.3.3.2  International  co-operation  of  the  control  authorities 
2.4  Future  demands  on  the  control authorities  in  the European 
Economic  Community  and  their feasibility 
2.4.1  Recommendations  of the European  Parliament 
2.4.2  Consequences 
2.4.2.1  National  control authorities 
2.4.2.2  The  European  data  protection  body 
2.5 
2.5 ;O 
2.5.  1 
2.5.2 
2.6 
Possible  crucial points  for  future  research 
Preliminary  remarks 
Crucial  points within  the  scope  of the  present  study 
Related  problems 
Bibliography 
Illustrations 
Organisational structure of Swedish  DIB 
Level  of decision-making 
Development  of  the  budget 
Activities  of  the DIB 





























Extension  of  protection  to  non-physical 
persons:  view  of  the  people  concerned 
The  legal  status  of  the  business 
The  size of  the  business 
Reactions  of  large  companies  in  their 
business  relations 
Reactions  of  large  and  small  companies 
in  their  business  relations 
The  public  or  private  nature  of 
non-physical  person  files 
Distinction  between  the  two  problems 
First  problem:  how  far  does  protection 
of  physical  persons  extend? 
Second  problem:  should  non-physical 
persons  actually  be  protected? 
Specificity  of  the  files  of  non-physical 
persons 
Significance  of  the  concept  of 
non-physical  person 
Nature  of  the  data  on  non-physical 
persons 
Public  data 
Revealed  data 
Gleaned  information 
Derived  information 
Information  obtained  by  spying 
Protection  necessary  for  non-physical 
persons 
The  requirement  of  secrecy 
Publicity  regulations  on  non-physical 
persons 
Difficulties  connected  wfth  computer  files 
Effective  protection  for  physical  persons 
The  case  of  mixed  files 
Files  containing  indirect  information 
about  physical  persons 
Conclusions  and  European  outlook 
Bibliography 















INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  DATA  PROTECTION 
DEFINITION  OF  THE  PROBLEM  AND  SUMt-1ARY 
Definition of the  problem 
Surmnary 
Concepts of economic  theory and methodology 
Problems of  the application of concepts of economic 
theory to the  analysis of costs  and profit margins 
Data protection as  a  "public benefit"  :  The  problem 
of the determination of the benefit 
External  and Alternative Costs:  Difficulties of 
Determination 
The  fundamental  positional value of relevant 
national  economic  concepts 
Limitation to costs  and profits on  the basis of 
business economics 
Methodological  method of procedure 
Costs of data protection  Estimates  and exoerience 
t 
in selected countries 
Great Britain 
General  Data Protection Debate 
6B 4.3.1.2  Special Cost Estimates 
4.3.1.3  The  Report of the Committee  on  Data Protection 
4.3.1.3.1  User Costs:  The  Study of PACTEL 
4.3.1.3.1.1  Terms  of Reference 
4.3.1.3.1.2  Cmception  and  methodological  Procedure 
4.3.1.3.1.3  Results  and  Evaluation of  the Study 
4.3.1.3.1.4  Conclusions  of the Committee  on  Data Protection 
4.3.1.3.2  Information Fees 
4.3.1.3.3  Registration Fees of  the Data Protection Authority 
4.3.1.4  Summary 
4.3.2  US  A 
4.3.2.1  Data Security Discussion 
4.3.2.2  Analysis of the Goldstein Privacy Estimation 
Hodel 
4.3.2.2.1  Structure  and Function of the Model 
4.3.2.2.2  Application of the Model 
4.3.2.2.3  Evaluation and Results of  the Study 
4.3.2.2.3.1  Data Protection Cost Structure 
4.3.2.2.3.2  Industry Aspects 
4.3.2.2.3.3  User Aspects 


















4. 3. 4·. 1 
4.3.4.2 
Experience with the Privacy Act 
Cost Survey of the Office of Management  and audget 





Extent of the  information requests 
Costs of giving  information 
Information fees 
Data security measures 
Loss of opportunity for  earnings 
Positive  consequences of the Data  Law 
International Competition Distortion 
International Data Harmonisation 
General Viewpoint of the Swedish Industrial 
Federation 
German  Federal Republic 
Estimation of costs before the  coming  into force 
of the Federal Data Protection Law 
Cost-related Experience with  the Federal Data 
Protection Law 
70 4.3.4.2.1  Data Protection Authorised  and  Data Protection 
Training 
4.3.4.2.2  Obligation to advise 
4.3.4.2.3  Information requests 
4.3.4.2.3.1  Volume  and  costs of information requests 
4.3.4.2.3.2  Information charges 
4.3.4.2.4  Data Security Measures 
4.3.4.2.5- Summarisation  and  Considered Thoughts 
4.4  Costs of Data Protection:  General Conclusion 
4.4.1  Over-estimation of Data Protection Costs 
4.4.2  Advising 
4.4.3  Information requests 
4.4.4  Data Protection Authorized Officers and other 







Registration and Licensing Fees 
Data Security 
Opportunity Costs 
Effects with regard to cost and other positive 
effects for  the data processing agencies 
The  Problems  of International Competition 
Distortions  caused by Data Protection Costs 

















Evaluation of the  competition problem 
Judgement  from  the point of view of the data 
subject 
Cost-effective Harmonisation Measures of  a 
Eur.opean  Data Protection Policy 
Cost-relevant elements of a  data protection 
harmonisation policy 
Principles 
Registration and  licensing 
National data protection authorities 
Notification 
Granting of information 
Data security 
Data protection supervisor  and data protection 
liability 
Costs of data protection harmonisation 
Possible  Main  Points of Emphasis  of Future 
Research Orientated towards  the  Economy 
Accompanying  research for  the preparation and 
implementation of European data protection 
guidelines 
Economic  aspects of the data protection of 
corporate bodies 
Legal  framework  of  a  European  common  data and 
information market 
72 Contents  of Section 5 
5.0  Introduction 
5.1  Technical  context  and  long-term trends 
5.1.1  Hardware  development 
5.1.2  Software 
5.1.3  The  appearance  of  the  electronic office 
5.1.4  Attempts  at  standardisation 
5.2  Should  the public  know  of the  existence of  files? 
5.3  Should  the  individual  know  of  the  existence of 
information  concerning  him  in  a  file? 
5.3.1  Notification methods 
5.3.2  Access  methods 
5.4  Should  the  individual  know  the  information  about 
him  in  a  file? 
5.4.1  Initiation of the  request 
5.4.2  Reply  to  the  request  or  notification 
5.4.2.1  The  essential  components  of  a  system 
5.4.2.2  Defining  information  about  an  individual 
5.4.2.3  Retrieval  of  information  connected  with  an 
individual 
5.4.2.4  Presentation of  the  results 
5.5  Can  the  information  be  corrected? 
5.6  Conclusion 
5.7  Bibliography 





















































The  motivation  for  this  item 
The  purposes  of  inspection 
Structure  of  section  6 
Referencing  system 
Definitions 
Introduction 
Definition of  'organisation' 
Definition of  'system' 
Definition  of  'data user' 
Definition of  'data',  'data  subject',  'information' 
Definition  of  'regulations' 
Definition of  'commissioning  body',  'Authority' 
Definition  of  'inspection',  'inspection visit', 
'inspection  report' 
Definition of  'inspector' 
Preliminary questions 
Introduction 
Actual  and  potential  breaches 
Selection  of  inspection  areas 
The  powers  of  the  inspector 
Statutory  and  voluntary  inspections 
An.  inspection  paradox 
Strictness 
Global  uniformity 




Particulars  of  the  system 
Data  subject's  access  to  his  record 
Registration  fee 
Data  quality 
Legitimate  processes 
Restricted  access 
Personnel 
Control 
The  inspection:  preparation 
Introduction 
Initiation of  the  inspection 
Factors  conducive  to  inspection 
What  is  the  system? 
Charging  the  inspector 
Timing  of  an  inspection 
Approach  to  the  organisation 
The  inspection:  information  gathering 
Introduction 
Preliminary  information 
Personnel 
Notifications 
Data  capture 















































Data  9uality 
Restricted  access 
Data  update 
Data  use 
Data  interrelation 
Data  dissemination 
Data  archival 
Data  erasure 
Control 
The  inspection:  conclusion 
Introduction 
Presentation  of  the  inspection  report 
Contents  of  the  inspection  report 
Subsequent  actions  by  the  commissioning  body 
The  inspector's other  findings 
Disposal  of  inspection materials 
The  inspector 
The  inspector's qualities 
Who  should  inspect? 
Relation  to  financial  auditing 
Questions  of  judgement 
Pressures  on  the  inspector 
How  helpful  should  the  inspector  be? 
Complaints  against  the  inspector 
The  inspector's  answerability 
Further  considerations 
Introduction 
Frequency  of  inspection 
Strictness of  inspection 
Attitude  of  data  user 
Secrecy  of  inspection  procedure 
Publication  of  the  inspection  report 
Inspecting  the  Authority 
The  cost  of  the  inspection 
Determination  of  the  regulations 
Relation  to  security 
International  aspects 
Computer  bureaux 
Non-standard  operations 
Sources  of  information 
Inspecting  ~atabases 
Undisclosed  systems 
Length  of  inspection visit 




Statutory  and  voluntary  inspections 
Notice  of  inspection 
Model  of  inspection  report 
Letter  following  inspection 
75 